The Titan Submersible Disaster Shocked the World. The Inside Story Is More Disturbing Than Anyone Imagined
What specific innovations did OceanGate incorporate into the design of the Cyclops 2 submersible?
$1 million and take 18 months to complete,” Rush wrote in an email to an OceanGate engineer in May 2017. “Given that the costs and time are so high, I think we should terminate the project.”
Instead, Rush sought to reassure potential customers and investors by repeatedly claiming that OceanGate had partnerships with organizations such as Boeing, the University of Washington, and NASA. In reality, these partnerships were either short-lived or nonexistent. Boeing, for example, provided some early design work on Titan but was not involved in its construction or testing. The University of Washington worked with OceanGate on an earlier submersible, Cyclops 1, but not on Titan. And while OceanGate did have a Space Act Agreement with NASA, this was simply a non-exclusive license to use some of NASA's patented technologies—it did not involve any collaboration on the design or testing of Titan.
Despite these setbacks, OceanGate continued to push ahead with its plans to take tourists to the Titanic in Titan. The company even raised the price of a ticket from $105,129 to $250,000, and announced that it would be launching two more submersibles, named Titanic Surveyor and Titanic Explorer, to meet the demand for dives to the wreck.
In June 2023, the Titan set out on its final, fateful expedition to the Titanic. The sub was carrying five people, including Rush and his son, when it imploded under the pressure of the ocean at a depth of 3,800 meters. The exact cause of the implosion is still under investigation, but it is clear that Titan was not built to withstand the immense pressures of the deep sea. Its carbon-fiber hull was not strong enough, and its acrylic viewport was not rated for the depth it was operating at.
The tragedy of the Titan has cast a shadow over the future of deep-sea exploration. It is a stark reminder of the dangers of cutting corners and ignoring expert advice in the pursuit of profit and innovation. The lessons learned from this disaster will no doubt inform the development of future submersibles, but at a great cost to the families of those who lost their lives aboard the Titan.
What role did Boeing and the University of Washington play in the early stages of Cyclops 2's development?
The Tragic Saga of the Titan Submersible: A Cautionary Tale of Overconfidence and Inadequate Testing
In 2015, OceanGate, a Seattle-based startup, began developing a submersible named Titan with the aim of taking tourists to the wreck of the Titanic. The company, led by CEO Stockton Rush, opted for a lightweight, carbon-fiber design with a 6,000-meter depth rating and a safety factor of 2.25, meaning it should withstand pressures equivalent to 13,500 meters. However, during testing, the model imploded at 4,500 meters, giving it a safety factor of just 1.18 for dives to the Titanic's depth. Despite this, OceanGate proceeded with construction, ignoring warnings from experts and even former employees about the inadequacy of testing and the risks associated with their design choices. In June 2023, the Titan imploded during a dive to the Titanic, killing all five people on board. This tragedy serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of overconfidence and cutting corners in the pursuit of innovation.
What were the consequences of the model imploding during the pressure test at the University of Washington?
The Titan submersible, developed by OceanGate, was designed to take paying customers down to the Titanic wreck site, 3,800 meters below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean. However, in June 2023, the Titan imploded during a dive, killing all five people on board. A trove of internal OceanGate emails and documents, as well as interviews with former employees, reveal that the company cut corners during the development of the submersible. OceanGate's CEO, Stockton Rush, overstated the progress of the project and lied about significant problems with the hull. The Titan was built with a carbon-fiber hull, a lightweight material that had not been previously used in deep-water submersibles. Although carbon fiber is strong, it can get progressively weaker in unexpected ways, especially if the manufacturing process is not carefully managed. Engineers at Boeing, who provided early design and manufacturing advice, warned of these risks and suggested a rigorous quality assurance process during manufacture and ultrasound testing of the hull after it was made. However, OceanGate did not follow these recommendations. The company tested the Titan's model hull to destruction only once and did not use the titanium components that would become fixtures on the final sub. Instead, they increased the thickness of the carbon-fiber hull in its design specs and commissioned the real thing. The submersible had a solid titanium front dome with a smaller acrylic viewport, which was also not tested according to rigorous standards. The documents and interviews reveal a company culture that dismissed caution and prioritized speed over safety.